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IMPROVING OUR PATENT SYSTEM FOR A
STRONGER AMERICA*
CARLOS J. MOORHAD**
On December 8, 1994, President William J. Clinton signed into
law the implementing legislation for the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").' The Senate approved this legislation
by a vote of 76 to 24, and the House of Representatives by a vote of
288 to 146.2 GATT devotes significant attention to the Agreement
on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property ("TRIPS
Agreement").3
* This article was originally drafted in early 1995. Since that time, H.R. 1733 was
amended to reflect improvements made in response to valuable comments submitted by
expert witnesses, Members, independent inventors, small business, large corporations,
industry organizations, patent law associations and the Patent and Trademark Office. This
amended version of H.R. 1733 was included as Title II of a more comprehensive patent bill,
H.R. 3460. The Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property unanimously approved
this legislation by voice vote without objection on May 15, 1996, and eleven Members of the
Subcommittee signed as original cosponsors of the bill. Also on May 15, 1996, the
Subcommittee rejected H.R. 359 by a vote of 12-2. One June 11, 1996, the House Judiciary
Committee unanimously approved H.R. 3460 by voice vote without objection. In addition,
Senator Hatch, the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, introduced and
advocated S. 1961. The provisions of 1961 are nearly identical to the provisions of Title II in
H.R. 3460.
** Carlos J. Moorhead is the United States Representative for the Twenty-Seventh Dis-
trict of California. Representative Moorhead is also the Chairman of the House Subcommit-
tee on Courts and Intellectual Property, the Subcommittee with jurisdiction on patents,
copyrights, trademarks and judicial administration. Before becoming Chairman, Represen-
tative Moorhead was the Ranking minority member on the Subcommittee for 12 years. He
has served on the Subcommittee since 1978.
1 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994); see also
140 CONG. REc. D1274 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 1994) (noting ratification of GATT Treaty when
President Clinton signed Uruguay Round Agreements Act into law).
2 Rollcall vote No. 507, 140 CONG. REC. H11534 (daily ed. Nov. 29, 1994); Rollcall vote
No. 329, 140 CONG. REC. S15379 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1994); see also Uruguay Round Agree-
ments Act Vote Report, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (voting record indicating approval of
GATT trade agreements).
3 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Dec. 15,
1993, GATT Doc. MTN/FA II-AIC, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994); see also Jeffrey A. Divney & Gary J.
Connell, Intellectual Property Provisions of the GATT, 23 COLO. LAw. 1069, 1069 (1994)
(recognizing TRIPS Agreement as significant intellectual property provisions of GATT);
Tara K. Giunta & Lily Shang, Ownership of Information in a Global Economy, 27 GEO.
WASH. J. INV'L L. & ECON. 327, 335-36 (1994) (discussing that TRIPS Agreement provides
minimum standards of intellectual property protection for patents, copyrights, and trade-
marks); Louis S. Sorell et al., Changes to U.S. Patent Law Under Gatt: Summary and Prac-
tice Recommendations, in FIFrH ANNUAL PATENT PROSECUTION WORKSHOP, at 95 (PLI Pat.,
Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Course Handbook Series No. 94-3949, 1995) (indicat-
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The TRIPS Agreement contains a key patent provision for the
establishment of an international standard minimum term for
patent protection.4 In accordance with GATT, the United States is
obliged to establish a minimum patent term of twenty years from
the time the patent application is filed.5 At the time GATT was
proposed, the United States provided only seventeen years of pro-
tection from the time the patent was issued.6 Consequently, a
change in the law was required to ensure compliance.7
The GATT implementing legislation took a straightforward ap-
proach to complying with this obligation-it simply adopted the
"twenty years from filing" term required by GATT." Since June 8,
1995, that has been the standard to measure patent term in the
ing that through TRIPS Agreement major changes have occurred in United States intellec-
tual property laws, particularly regarding patents); John G. Byrne, Comment, Changes on
the Frontier of Intellectual Property Law: An Overview of the Changes Required by GATT,
34 DUQ. L. Rv. 121, 129 (1995) (suggesting that TRIPS Agreement resulted in major
changes in patent law).
4 35 U.S.C. § 154(aX3) as amended by Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. 103-465,
§ 532 (a)(1), 108 Stat. 4809, 4984-85 (1994) (providing that patent term begins on date
patent is issued and ends 20 years from date application originally filed in United States);
see also Divney & Connell, supra note 3, at 1069-70 (recognizing standard minimum patent
term as significant provision of GATT); Ralph Oman, Intellectual Property After the Uru-
guay Round, 42 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 18, 28 (1994) (noting that TRIPS Agreement
protects product patents, process patents and does not permit others from marketing prod-
uct made with patented process); Anthony D. Sabatelli & J.C. Rasser, Impediments to
Global Patent Law Harmonization, 22 N. Ky. L. REv. 579, 602 (1995) (indicating that
TRIPS Agreement of GATT contains eight sections, each addressing different fields of intel-
lectual property; one section specifically addresses area of patent practice providing mini-
mum standards of patent protection and enforcement); Sorell et al., supra note 3, at 96-99
(providing examples to demonstrate patent term provisions).
5 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of In-
tellectual Property Rights, Dec. 15, 1993, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUI.ND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. See generally Jane E. R.
Poters & Jean B. Fordis, The Impact of GATT and TRIPS on U.S. Patent Law, 10 ME. B. J.
400, 401 (1995) (detailing change in U.S. patent protection after implementation of TRIPS
Agreement under GATr).
6 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2). Prior to 1994, the patent term had been seventeen years from the
date of issuance. Id. In order to adhere to the GATT TRIPS requirement, the patent term
was changed to twenty years. Id.; see Jared Bobrow & Elizabeth Enayati, Patent Practition-
ers Beware: Gatt Changes the Rules in U.S. Patent Law, 7 J. PROPRIETARY RTs. 13 (1995)
(detailing prior patent law and effect of GATT implementing legislation, including TRIPS
agreement); Divney & Connell, supra note 3, at 1070 (noting that prior to 1994, United
States Patent Act only protected patents for 17 years from date of issuance).
7 See Byrne, supra note 3, at 129 (indicating that GATT implementing legislation re-
quired 20 year patent term in order to comply with provisions of GATT'); see also Divney &
Connell, supra note 3, at 1070 (noting that United States was required to amend its law to
comply with GATT TRIPS minimum patent term of 20 years from filing date).
8 Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994); see Bo-
brow & Enayati, supra note 6, at 13 (noting that GATT implementing legislation, Uruguay
Round Agreements Act, amends United States statute to provide for 20 year patent term);
see also Sorell, supra note 3, at 95-97 (stating that GAT implementing legislation adopted
20 year patent term required by GATT).
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United States.9 At the time GATT was enacted, however, it was
understood Congress would evaluate the solutions provided by
GATT and assess the major problems still facing United States'
inventors and industries. Three major issues still must be ad-
dressed: (1) ensuring that foreign countries continue to open their
markets and provide sufficient protection for United States' inven-
tors, 10 (2) ending the practice of submarine patents, an abuse of
the seventeen year term that could potentially devastate entire
industries, 1 and (3) securing sufficient patent term protection.' 2
In 1995, I introduced House Resolution 1733 ("H.R. 1733"),1' a
bill that addresses and resolves each of the above concerns. 14 An
9 35 U.S.C. § 154(aX2) (1988); see Byrne, supra note 3, at 129 (noting that 20 year term
became effective on June 8, 1995 and explaining impact of new law).
10 See Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: To-
ward a New Multiculturalism, 76 IOWA L. REV. 273, 274 (1991) (indicating that United
States has become vulnerable to piracy, expropriation, and inadequate protection in certain
foreign countries).
11 See Susan Gembrowski, San Diegans Differ on Big Changes in U.S. Patent Law, SAN
DiNGo DAiLY TRANscawr, Aug. 14, 1995, at Al (explaining problem of submarine patents
and providing intermittent windshield wiper as example).
12 See Giunta & Shang, supra note 3, at 338 (noting concerns created by TRIPS Agree-
ment, including enforceability of its provisions); see also Sabatelli & Rasser, supra note 4,
at 602-03 (suggesting result of TRIPS Agreement will be failure to ensure sufficient patent
protection).
13 H.R. 1733, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). Editorial Note: Since the substantive writing
of this article, H.R. 1733 was revised and included in another bill, H.R. 3460, which was
approved unanimously by voice vote without objection in the subcommittee and full judici-
ary hearing.
14 See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1995) [hereinafter Hearings Before the
House Subcomm. on Courts & Intellectual Property] (testimony of Roger L. May, Assistant
General Counsel, Intellectual Property Practice Group, Ford Motor Company). May sup-
ports H.R. 1733 and explains that Ford is a "technology-driven company," designing and
engineering new products to be responsive to customer's demands. Id. In Ford's view, "H.R.
1733 builds upon the stability and predictability provided by recent patent term changes,
while H.R. 359 destroys those aspects." Id. Ford supports H.R. 1733 because it does not
change the patent term provisions of GAIT, thereby assuring "timely flow of technology
necessary to keep America competitive with other nations and ensures patent protection."
Id.; see also Changes in US. Patent Policy and Their Implications for Energy and Environ-
ment Research and Developments before the Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment of
the House Comm. on Science, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1996) (testimony of Roger L. May,
Assistant General Counsel - Intellectual Property Ford Motor Company) (arguing against
passage of H.R. 359); Stacy Berg, et al., Bill to Provide for Publication of Patent Applica.
tions, 7 J. PaROmTrARY RIGHTs 27, 27-28 (1995) (outlining provisions of H.R. 1733); Joseph
A. Fischetti, Harmonizing U.S. Patent Laws-Help or Hindrance, CoNN. LAw TaR., Oct.
16, 1995, at S19 (discussing congressional response to current U.S. patent laws and high-
lighting provisions of H.R. 1733); Gembrowski, supra note 11 at Al. This article notes the
changes in patent law and recognizes the division existing as those involved with patents
decide which rules best suit them. Id. The author outlines the positions espoused by the
two groups an indicates the arguments for and against H.R. 1733 and H.R. 359. Id.; House
Panel May Act This Year on Proposed Changes in Patents, FED. TECH. R., Nov. 9, 1995, at 3.
It is indicated that H.R. 1733 supports change in patent law created by GAIT implement-
ing legislation. Id. In so doing, American inventors are subjected to same terms as those in
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opposing bill, H.R. 35915 seeks to reverse the benefits secured in
the TRIPS Agreement and to combine the current filing based sys-
tem with the old issuance based system.16 The approach adopted
in H.R. 359 encourages the manipulative and destructive practice
of submarine patenting.1 7 Even worse, H.R. 359 ignores the pro-
gress made in opening foreign trade barriers to American inven-
tors by inhibiting the United States' ability to further open these
markets.' 8 There is before us a question as to whether we go for-
ward and strengthen our inventors and our industries to compete
in a global economy or whether we roll back the gains that we
have already made.
I. FOREIGN TRADE BARRrERS: THE DESTRUCTION OF
COMPETITIVENESS IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE AT THE
EXPENSE OF THE UNITED STATES.
Growth in the intellectual property industries has exploded in
the past several years. 19 For example, copyright-based industries
foreign countries. Id. But see Robert H. Rines & Skip Kaltenheuser, Patent Legislation
Pending, CoN. LAw TRm., July 3, 1995, at 21 (criticizing H.R. 1733 for providing Japanese
companies with U.S. inventions allowing them to "leap frog" U.S. innovations).
15 H.R. 359, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). Editorial Note: Since the substantive writing
of this article, H.R. 359 was voted down in the Subcommittee by a vote of 12-2.
16 See id. This legislation proposes that the patent term be changed to be the longer of
seventeen years from date of issue or twenty years from date of filing. Id.; LEXs 1995 Bill
Tracking H.R. 359. On January 4, 1995 the bill was referred to committee and there are
currently one hundred and thirty co-sponsors in the House. Id.; see also Hearings Before the
House Subcomm. on Courts & Intellectual Property, supra note 14. Roger May states that
"H.R. 359 seeks to return us to a system subject to abuse driven by greed-a system which
is in fact hostile to those seeking to market new technologies ... [a] backward step." Id.
17 See Ted Bunker, Does Patent Law Sell Out Small Inventors?, INvESTOR's Bus. DAILY,
May 1, 1995, at A4 (explaining how H.R. 359 would affect "submarine patents").
18 See Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Courts & Intellectual Property, supra
note 14 (testimony of William D. Budinger, Chairman and CEO of Rodel, Inc.). Mr. Bud-
inger expresses concerns regarding H.R. 359 and believes it will reduce the field of opportu-
nity for U.S. inventors and make the United States less attractive for manufacturing. Id.;
see also Changes in U.S. Patent Law and Their Implications for Energy and Environmental
Research and Development Before the House Subcomm. on Energy and Environment of the
Comm. on Science, 105th Cong. 2d Sess. (1996) (testimony of William D. Budinger, Chair-
man & CEO, Rodell, Inc.); Rines & Kaltenheuser, supra note 14, at 21 (detailing effects of
H.R. 359).
19 See Janet Hamilton, What's Going on in Intellectual Property Law?, 84 AM. Soc'Y INT'L
L. PRAc. 256, 257 (1990) (indicating that intellectual property is one of few areas in which
United States has trade surplus and calculating that United States received eight billion
dollars in intellectual property royalties while paying only one and a quarter billion); see
also John T. Masterson, Jr., Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in International
Transactions, in TE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE & INVEST-
MENT 1994, at 333-34 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 863, 1994)
(noting that intellectual property accounts for approximately 25% of U.S. exports, increase
from 12% eight years ago).
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in the United States are growing at twice the annual rate of the
economy and employing new workers at almost four times the an-
nual rate of the economy as a whole.2" As far as the importance of
international patent protection is concerned, the United States is
already recognized as a world leader in inventing new technolo-
gies. 21 As a result of its increased importance, intellectual prop-
erty protection has become an essential feature of our trade pol-
icy. 22 Negotiating and enforcing strong intellectual property
agreements has taken on a new urgency because of the increased
importance of intellectual property industries to our national
competitiveness.23
In testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, Ambassa-
dor Michael Kantor, the United States Trade Representative, em-
phasized how essential it is that America break down foreign
trade barriers. Mr. Kantor stressed the following points:
20 See generally STEPHBEN E. SIWEK AND HAROLD FuRcHTGrTr-RoTH, INTL INTELL. PROP.
ALLIANCE ECONOMISTS INC., COPYRIGHT INDUsTRIEs IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: 1977-1993
(1995). Last February, the author participated in a press conference at which this report
was released. This report was prepared for the International Intellectual Property Alliance
by Economists, Inc. These figures are indicative of just how important the intellectual prop-
erty industries are to today's economy, and to America's economic future.
In 1993, the copyright industries accounted for 3.7 percent of the U.S. Gross Domestic
Product-this means $238.6 billion. Id. Between 1977 and 1993, employment in U.S. copy-
right industries more than doubled to 3 million workers, which is 2.5 percent of the total
U.S. work force. Id. Between 1988 and 1993, the U.S.copyright industry employment grew
almost four times the annual rate of the whole economy-2.6 percent versus .7 percent. Id.
The copyright industries contribute more to U.S. economy and employ more workers than
any single manufacturing sector, including aircraft, primary metals, textiles, apparel, or
chemicals. Id. In 1993, the U.S. copyright industries achieved estimated foreign sales of
$45.8 billion. After automobiles and parts, the copyright industry is the second largest in-
dustry in exports. Id.
21 Intellectual Property Rights: US. Companies' Comparative Patent Experiences in Ja-
pan, Europe and United States Before the Subcomm. on Int7 Trade, Senate Comm. on Fi-
nance, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter Comparative Patent Experiences] 13 (testi-
mony of Allan I. Mendelowitz, Dir. of Intl Trade, Finance and Competitiveness Issues of
General Accounting Office); see Michael L. Doane, TRIPS and International Intellectual
Property Protection in an Age of Advancing Technology, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & PoL'y 465,
465-66 (1994). The United States is the world's leading technological innovator. Id.
22 See Doane, supra note 21, at 465-66. Strong protection of intellectual property rights
is important to the United States as world leader in inventing technology. Id.; see also
Marshall A. Leaffer, Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New
Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REv. 273, 274-75, 288-98 (1991). It is noted that intellectual
property has become a major component of U.S. trade and U.S. competitiveness on a global
market. Id. To protect these interests, the United States regards intellectual property pro-
tection a necessary component of U.S. trade policy. Id.
23 See Doane, supra note 21, at 465-66. International protection of intellectual property
rights is important to the U.S. agenda. Id. Negotiating international trading system re-
forms is essential to protect intellectual property rights. Id.; see also Leaffer, supra note 22,
at 288-98. The United States regards strong intellectual property agreements as a neces-
sity. Id. As such, negotiating, creating, and implementing such agreements has played a
primary role in U.S. trade policy. Id.
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Th[e] global economy offers tremendous opportunities for
American workers. Over 11 million workers in this country
owe their jobs to exports. These jobs pay higher wages, on av-
erage, than jobs not related to trade. Every billion dollars of
exports supports 17,000 jobs. Clearly, expanding trade is criti-
cal to our effort to create good, high-wage jobs. * * *
The global economy will not disappear. We cannot turn
back the clock. Even if we could, we must face the fact that
the United States has a mature economy and we have only
four percent of the world's population. Future opportunities
for growth here at home will depend in part on providing
goods and services to the other 96 percent. Given this fact,
opening markets, expanding trade and enforcing our trade
agreements are important to fostering growth here at home.
After World War II and during the Cold War, the United
States used trade policy as part of the strategy to help rebuild
the economies of Europe and Japan and to resist communist
expansionism. We led the world in global efforts to dismantle
trade barriers and create institutions that would foster global
growth. * * *
But now we are no longer the sole dominant economic
power in the world. We are the world's largest economy-and
largest trading nation-but our economy, which represented
40 percent of the world's output following World War II, now
represents 20 percent. Europe and Japan rebuilt and became
tough competitors. The newly industrialized nations, such as
the so-called Asian Tigers, became increasingly protective,
winning a share of our market, without opening theirs
equally.
Although we welcome the products, services and invest-
ment of other nations here in the United States, now we must
insist that the markets of our trading partners be open to the
products, services and investment of the United States. We
will no longer tolerate "free riders" in the global trading sys-
tem. We insist on reciprocity in our trade agreements. This is
a critical change in the way we view both trade policy and
foreign policy. * * *
The road to prosperity is not always smooth. Sometimes our
trading partners will have economic problems, and we must
remember that the success of our economy is inextricably
linked to the economies of other nations. Some would have us
follow the ostrich approach: if we just stick our heads in the
sand, the problems of other nations will simply go away. But
history has repeatedly shown cutting ourselves off from the
[Vol. 11:465
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world is a sure formula toward a less successful and prosper-
ous country.24
I did not vote in favor of the GATT implementing legislation for
a number of reasons, none of which relate to the TRIPS Agree-
ment. On the contrary, I am certain that the copyright and patent
provisions of GATT are good for the United States-these provi-
sions have always had the support of every major national copy-
right, patent, and bar association that takes an interest in patent
and copyright law.25 This support is derived from the recognition,
of American businesses, that the United States was declining in
several key high technological areas due in part to a lack of strong
international patent protection, especially in Japan.26
II. GATT, BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WITH JAPAN AND H.R. 1733:
REQUIRING THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TO SOLVE MANY
OF THE SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS AMERICAN
INVENTORS HAVE EXPERIENCED WITH
THE JAPANESE PATENT SYSTEM
At the request of several Senators, the United States General
Accounting Office ("GAO") examined and compared patent protec-
tion for United States products in the United States, Europe, and
Japan. The GAO released a report of its findings in July 1993.27
In this report, the GAO surveyed 346 United States firms that
were top United States patent holders in the chemical, semicon-
ductor, and biotechnological fields. 28 These companies had exten-
sive experience with the Japanese patent system-ninety-two per-
cent of the responding companies had filed patent applications in
Japan in the past ten years, and sixty-eight percent had ten or
more Japanese patents.29
A full sixty-five percent of the firms experienced at least one dif-
ficulty with the Japanese patent system that they considered to be
24 Hearings on Trade Policy Agenda and Trade Agreements Program Before the Sub-
comm. on Finance, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of Ambassador Michael Kan-
tor, United States Trade Representative).
25 See infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text (discussing Japanese government's at-
tempt to solve bilateral patent disputes with United States).
26 See Comparative Patent Experiences, supra note 21, at 13 (discussing Japanese patent
protection for United States and European patents).
27 See id. (comparing patent protection in Japan, Europe and United States).
28 See id. at 22.
29 See id.
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a "very great" or "great" problem to their companies.30 Companies
were consistently dissatisfied with the cost and length of time to
obtain a patent, the scope of the claims granted, and the inability
to obtain patents for pioneering inventions in Japan.3 1 Companies
experienced these problems two to eight times more often in Ja-
pan than in the United States or Europe.32
The TRIPS Agreement in GATT was effective in forcing Japan
to open its system and to establish more patent protection for
United States inventors and patent holders. 3 It requires Japan to
allow for at least limited discovery procedures in patent infringe-
ment cases and to increase the term for patent protection.3 4 Per-
haps most importantly, GATT provided uniform standards and
procedures for the international enforcement of intellectual prop-
erty rights.3 5 Despite these improvements, GATT left a great deal
to be done to make Japan's patent system user-friendly to Ameri-
can inventors and patent holders.36
As part of its survey, the GAO asked companies to identify po-
tential changes that would improve their patent experiences in
Japan.3 7 The survey resulted in six highly requested improve-
ments and included the percentage of companies that believed
such improvements would help them to a moderate, great, or very
great extent.
30 See id. at 27.
31 See Comparative Property Rights, supra note 21.
32 See id. at 26-27.
33 See, e.g., Mitsuo Matsushita, A Japanese Perspective on Intellectual Property Rights
and the GATT, 1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 81, 86-87. The author notes that Japanese intel-
lectual property laws substantially conform to the standards required by the TRIPS Agree-
ment. Id. Japanese law complies with the twenty year protection period after filing and of
priority after filing. Id.
34 See Draft Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods (Annex III), GATT Doc. MTN.TNC/W/FA (Dec. 20,
1991). This is the original draft of the discovery mandates that eventually made its way
into the current law. Id.; see also, Charles L. Gholz, Practicing Under the New Patent Inter-
ference Rules and New Rule 131, 77 J. PAT & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 858, 863 (1995)
(describing sanctions for failure to provide foreign discovery).
35 See Monique L. Corday, GAT v. WIPO, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 121, 133-
37 (1994) (detailing enforcement of GATT provisions among foreign nations).
36 See, e.g., Nhat D. Phan, Note and Comment, Leveling the Playing Field: Harmoniza.
tion of Antitrust Guidelines for International Patent Licensing Agreements on the United
States, Japan, and the European Union, 10 Am. U. J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 447, 472-79 (1994)
(noting differences in Japanese and American patent system and suggesting changes to
make Japanese system more suitable to American inventors).
37 See id.
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First, eighty-nine percent of the respondents believed that al-
lowing the initial filing of a patent application in English would
improve their patent experiences in Japan. Seventy-four percent
believed that expediting the processing of patent applications (by
requiring a Japanese Patent Office action within two years after
the examination has begun) would improve the process. Sixty-
seven percent suggested adopting a twelve-month grace period.
Sixty-three percent felt that a doctrine of equivalents should be
applied. Changing from a pre-grant opposition system to a post-
grant opposition system found favor with forty-nine percent of the
respondents. Finally, forty-six percent felt that there should be a
change from a seven-year examination deferral to a three-year ex-
amination deferral .3  As a sidenote to the survey, a number of
United States companies have also complained about the Japa-
nese Patent Office practice of granting compulsory licenses.3 9
In addition to the GATT framework, the United States and Jap-
anese governments have addressed several of these issues in di-
rect negotiations that resulted in two bilateral accords.4 ° In these
agreements, dated January and August 1994, the Japanese gov-
ernment agreed to make the following four major substantive
changes in their patent laws to benefit United States inventors:
(1) permit United States inventors to file their applications in
English, (2) conclude patent examinations within thirty-six
months at the request of the applicant, (3) eliminate pre-grant op-
positions and consolidate post-grant oppositions, and (4) end the
practice of allowing dependent patent compulsory licensing. 41
38 See id.
39 See Impact on the United States of the New GATT Patent Accords Before the Subcomm.
on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on International Rela-
tions, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) [hereinafter Impact of GATT Patent Accords] (state-
ment of Bruce A. Lehman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents
and Trademarks).
40 See Kenneth Parks et al., Recent Developments, International Developments, Japan
Bolsters Intellectual Property Rights, 7 No. 3 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 33, 33 (1995) (noting
Japan's amended intellectual property laws in accordance with TRIPS); cf Nancy J. Linck
& John E. McGarry, Patent Procurement and Enforcement in Japan-A Trade Barrier, 27
GEo. WASH. INT'L L. & ECON. 411, 411-12 (1993-94) (enumerating deficiencies in Japan's
law before TRIPS agreement and discussing proposed change that includes TRIPS agree-
ment as well as World intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Draft Patent Law
Treaty and these bilateral agreements).
41 See Impact of GATT Patent Accords, supra note 39 (statement of Bruce A. Lehman,
Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks); see also
Proposals to Implement New patent Term and Provisional Application Are Issued, 49 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1208 at 149, 151 (1994); Bill Would Provide Early
Publication of Patents, 50 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1231 at 114 (1995);
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In exchange for these four concessions, the United States agreed
to adopt a twenty year term from filing and eighteen month publi-
cation-two changes that the United States has either already
made or wanted to make anyway. 42 In sum, the Japanese govern-
ment agreed to resolve more than half of the most egregious
problems identified by American patent holders in exchange for
two changes in the American system that have long had the in-
dependent support of the present and past presidential adminis-
trations, United States industry, and intellectual property
associations.4 3
The Japanese government has already fulfilled its obligations
under the agreements." In order to satisfy our end of the bargain,
we must enact H.R. 1733 as soon as possible-the United States
promised to comply by January 1, 1996. 4 5 It is clear that any fu-
ture agreements with Japan that relate to intellectual property,
and possibly any other subject matter, will hinge first upon the
United States honoring its commitments in these accords.46
Linck & McGarry, supra note 40, at 426-29 (discussing presumed impact at bilateral nego-
tiations prior to actual accords); cf Angela M. Beam, Comment, Piracy at American Intel-
lectual Property in China, 4 INT'L L. & PRAc. 335, 336 (1995) (asserting that intellectual
property rights are being trampled by Chinese persons who counterfeit).
42 See Byrne, supra note 3, at 129-30 (1995) (noting effective date of twenty-year term as
June 8, 1995); see also Lynn H. Pasahaw et al., Recent Events Relating to Biotechnology:
Law and Litigation, CA03 ALI-ABA 151, 157 (1995) (recognizing twenty-year term imple-
mentation); Berg et al., supra note 14, at 27 (reporting on proposed bill for publication of
patent applications eighteen months after filing).
43 See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text (discussing United States and Japanese
agreements on extending patent protection for United States patents); see also Business in
Brief, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 17, 1994, at D3 (reporting signed accord that will effectively
end Japan's practice of allowing third parties to oppose competitor's patent before it is
granted); Randy Barrett, Opposition Growing to Patent System Changes; Leading
Lawmakers and Inventors Unite to Defeat White House Patent Policy, WASH. TECH., Sept.
21, 1994 available in WESTLAW, ALLNEWSPLUS Library, 1994 WL 3744970, at * 2-3
(posting that Japanese-United States accord has complicated United States patent sys-
tem); Teresa Riordan, U.S., Japan Sign Accord Changing Patent Policies, AUSTIN AMERi-
CAN-STATESMAN, Aug. 17, 1994, at D2 (noting reduced review time for patent applications
under accord).
44 See Business in Brief, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 17, 1994, at D3 (noting that by April 1,
1995 agreement would be in place); see also U.S., Japan Sign Agreement on Patents, OR-
LANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 17, 1994, at A14 (establishing that Japan agreed to comply by April
1, 1995).
45 See U.S., Japan Sign Accord to Speed Patent Process, STAS-TRm. (Minneapolis-St.
Paul), Aug. 17, 1994, at D2 (reporting that all provisions of agreement would be in place by
January 1996); see also Jeff Leads, U.S., Japan Sign Accord on Patent Practices, SEATTLE
Trams, Aug. 17, 1994, at D1 (recognizing United States obligations under agreement);
Linck & McGarry, supra note 40, at 428 (noting targeted implementation date as January
1, 1996).
4 See Linck & McGarry, supra note 40, at 426-29 (discussing impact of bilateral agree-
ment and emphasizing necessity of United States cooperation).
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III. H.R. 1733: THE BASIC PROVISIONS
A brief explanation of H.R. 1733's provisions is necessary before
describing the additional solutions it adopts. First, the substance
and rationale of the bill's primary provision is the eighteen month
publication of patent applications. Under current United States
law, all applications for patents in the United States are kept se-
cret by the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO"). 47 Publication
does not occur until the patent is actually granted.48 All of the
major patent systems throughout the world, with the exception of
the United States, publish applications within eighteen months of
the earliest effective filing date. The current system places United
States inventors at a disadvantage at a time when worldwide pat-
ent protection is becoming increasingly important.4 9 For example,
an invention that is the subject of a patent application in Japan
will be published in the Japanese language in eighteen months.5 0
Inventors reviewing the Japanese patent application disclosures
47 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1988); see also Byrne, supra note 3, at 131 (noting practices under
current U.S. patent law such as secret nature of patent applications).
48 See BRADFORD J. DuFf, PREPARING THE PATENT APPLICATION, UNDERSTANDING Bio-
TECHNOLOGY LAW 94 (Gale R. Peterson ed., 1993) (noting filing and prosecuting procedure
in procurement of patent); see also ROBERT P. MERGES, PATENT LAw AND POLICY 30-32
(1992) (setting forth an overview of U.S. patent system); William N. Hulsey et al., Recent
Developments in Patent Law, 4 TEx. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 99, 110-11 (1995) (discussing PTO
examination guidelines).
49 See James P. Chandler, The Loss of New Technology to Foreign Competitors: U.S.
Companies Must Search for Protective Solutions, 27 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 305,
313-14 (1993-94) (discussing problems of protecting intellectual properties in United
States); see also Divney & Connell, supra note 3, at 1071 (asserting need to level playing
field by amending current U.S. patent laws); Paul A. Ragusa, Eighteen Months to Publica-
tion: Should the United States Join Europe and Japan by Promptly Publishing Patent Ap-
plications?, 26 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 143, 143 (1993) (positing that adoption of
publication scheme used by Europe and Japan would allow U.S. patent market to be com-
petitive on global market); Louis S. Sorell et al., Changes to U.S. Patent Law Under GA7T:
Summary and Practice Recommendations, in Fn'rH ANNuAL PATENT PROSECUTION WORK-
SHOP, at 95, 95 (PLI Pat., Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Hand-
book Series, No. G4-3949, 1995) (concluding that amended patent laws would be beneficial
to American companies competing in international marketplace).
50 See Mark S. Cohen, Japanese Patent Law and the WIPO Patent Law Harmonization
Treaty: A Comparative Analysis, 4 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 847, 867
(1994) (stating that Japanese law calls for patent applications to be laid open for public
inspection); see also John C. Lindgren & Craig J. Yudell, Protecting American Intellectual
Property in Japan, 10 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 1, 18-19 nn.57, 58 (1994)
(citing PATENT LAw, art. 65 (Japan)) (patent applications automatically published eighteen
months from filing date); The Japanese Patent Office, Obtaining Industrial Property Rights
in Japan, at 8 (1985) (asserting that all Japanese patent applications are published eight-
een months after filing). See generally JAPANESE LAws RELATING TO INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY
(AIPPI Japan 1993) (setting forth english-language version of Japan's patent law).
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will have the benefit of the early disclosure in Japan.51 This is
especially beneficial to domestic inventors in Japan because they
receive early disclosure of the technology in their own language.
In 1994, nearly forty percent of all applications filed with the
PTO claimed foreign priority and, under the laws of the country of
original filing, had to be published within eighteen months.52 Of
the remaining applications, nearly one-third were granted within
eighteen months.53 More importantly, just over one-half of patent
applications originally filed in the United States in 1993 were also
filed in one or more foreign countries.54 Conjunctively, these sta-
tistics reveal that approximately eighty percent of all patents filed
in the United States may be available to foreign inventors in their
native tongue within eighteen months.
However in the United States, American inventors and busi-
nesses are currently deprived of the benefit of an English lan-
guage publication of the technology disclosed in an application for
a patent until the patent is actually issued.55 This situation pro-
vides foreign inventors with a clear advantage relative to the
United States.
51 See Cohen, supra note 50, at 851 (recognizing that some new Japanese patent systems
are catalysts for technological development); see also Linck & McGarry, supra note 40, at
414 (arguing that Japanese patent system benefits domestic industry at expense of foreign
patent holders in Japan); Giunta & Shang, supra note 3, at 349 (noting that published
applications are disclosed to public prior to being patented); Sue Holloway, Comment,
"Black Box" Agreements: The Marketing of U.S. Technical Know-How in the Pacific Rim, 23
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 199, 207 (1992) (positing that time lapses in high technology fields are
crucial to future development).
52 Letter from the United States Patent and Trademark Office evaluating data in the
Automated Patent System bibliographic file for patents granted in calendar year 1994; see
also Jeffrey M. Samuels, Understanding Basic Trademark Law, in 1995 U.S. PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE (PTO) PRACTICE 413 (PLI Pat. Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary
Prop. Course Handbook Series No. G4-3947, 163, 165, 1995) (finding that in 1994 PTO
received 155,376 patent and trademark applications).
53 See Samuels, supra note 52, at 419 (discussing statistical report on number of patents
granted).
54 WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY STATISTICS
1993 24-25 (1995); see Susan E. Gustad, Casenotes and Comments, Legal Ownership of
Plant Genetic Resources-Fewer Options for Farmers, 18 HAanLuE L. REv. 459, 461 (1995)
(noting that in 1993, PTO received about 188,000 applications); Laurence Smith, Patent
Examination in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, in FUNDAMENTALS OF PATENT LAW
AND PRACTICE 27, 29 (1994) (finding average patent application pendency time of 18
months, from filing to issue or abandonment, in United States).
55 Marvin Motsenbocker, Comment, Proposed Changes to Japanese and United States
Patent Law Enforcement Systems, 3 PAC. Rim L. & POL'Y J. 389, 395 (1995) (recognizing
that Japan has recently begun to accept applications in English); see Andrew Pollack, U.S.
Agreed to Alter Patents, Period of Coverage, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 20, 1994, at D2 (noting that
Japanese Patent Organization (JPO) only accepted patent applications in Japanese). But
see 35 U.S.C. § 100 et. seq. (1988) (exchanging United States patent term length for Japan's
acceptance of applications in English).
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H.R. 1733 provides American inventors with a prompt English-
language publication of current technology.5 6 Inventors would no
longer be required to wait until a patent is granted to gain access
to that technology.57 Technology and ideas that would otherwise
be unavailable because a patent is not granted, might also become
available. American inventors would be able to take advantage of
this earlier access to English-language patent application technol-
ogy and build upon it more rapidly than they can in the current
system. In this way, the Constitutional objective to "promote the
progress of science and useful arts" is advanced.58
Eighteen month publication helps inventors avoid the commit-
ment of substantial resources to develop an invention based on an
incomplete, erroneous assessment of its patentability.59 In this re-
gard, early publication provides the public an enhanced opportu-
nity to submit prior art-relevant, prior technical information-to
the PTO in connection with pending applications.60 In some tech-
nologies, this provides a mechanism to bring the best and closest
prior art to the attention of the PTO while applications are
pending.
56 See H.R. 1733, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (posing amendments to 35 U.S.C.
§ 119(B) to require translation upon request).
57 See id. (calling for publication of applications eighteen months after filing, thus giving
inventors access to technology prior to patent protection).
58 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. This section reads in pertinent part: "[tlo promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." Id.; see Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 45 (1824) (asserting nationwide protection for inventors under U.S. Con-
stitution); John v. Orth, Thinking About Law Historically: Why Bother?, 70 N.C. L. REv.
287, 291 (1991) (discussing how framers of Constitution recognized 'Useful arts' to include
those of inventors). See generally PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND
RELATED STATE DocTRINEs CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
20-21 (3d ed. 1993) (recognizing intent of framers of Constitution with respect to this
section).
59 See, e.g., Patent Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 1732 and H.R. 1733 Before the Sub-
comm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) [hereinafter Patent Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 1732 and H.R.
1733] (statement of Bruce A. Lehman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner
of Patents and Trademarks) (asserting that H.R. 1733 would permit greater third party
participation).
60 See James Anglehart, Extending the International Phase of PCT Applications, 77 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 101, 104-05 (1995) (noting wide-spread availability of pub-
lished patent applications producing greater efficiency in technology); see also Donald S.
Chisum, The Harmonization of International Patent Law, 26 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 437, 440
(1993) (discussing effects of early publication as being improved patent examination qual-
ity); Robert W. Pritchard, The Future Is Now-The Case for Patent Harmonization, 20 N.C.
J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 291, 303 (1995) (positing that American inventors would benefit
from knowing possibilities of patent issuance before undertaking costly procedural steps).
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H.R. 1733 also promotes more efficient use of limited research
and development resources by preventing duplication.6 1 Finally,
together with the twenty year term, early publication virtually
eliminates the submarine patent problem, explained infra.
In return for disclosure that would be made by virtue of early
publication of patent applications, successful patent applicants
would be given provisional rights to obtain compensation for any
use of an invention disclosed in the application for patent for the
time period from publication to grant.62 H.R. 1733 contains a "pro-
visional rights" section that allows the patent applicant-once his
patent issues-to sue for a reasonable royalty, anyone who may
have used his patent after it was published.63 This is a right that
patent applicants do not have today.
Under current law, a problem arises if the patent application is
published but does not issue for twelve months. The notice "Pat-
ent Pending," carries little weight. If someone uses a patent
before it is issued, the applicant has no rights to a reasonable roy-
alty fee.6 4 Once the patent is issued, the unauthorized usage can
be stopped and the applicant can recover for the time the inven-
tion was used after the patent is issued, but nothing for use prior
to issue.65
In conjunction with a twenty year term, provisional rights
would ensure that each successful patent applicant obtains at
least eighteen and a half years of patent rights (provisional rights
from publication at eighteen months until grant and full rights
upon grant) regardless of patent pendency.66 If a provisional pat-
ent application is filed or if publication is requested earlier than
the eighteenth month, a patent holder could obtain up to nineteen
and a half years or more of patent rights.
61 See H.R. 1733, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (providing public with early disclosures of
technology-foreign or domestic); see also Patent Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 1732 and
H.R. 1733, supra note 59 (statement of Bruce A. Lehman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce
and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks) (supporting bill that provides for efficiency
in technological advances).
62 See H.R. 1733, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1995) (allowing for recovery in time period
between publication and patent issuance).
63 See id.
64 See William J. Brunet, Impact of Patent Itemization Treaty on Drafting and Prosecut-
ing U.S. and Foreign Patent Applications in GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SERIES: PRAC-
TICAL STRATEGIES - - PATENT, at 177, 319 (PLI Patent, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Liter-
ary Property Course Handbook Series, 1991) (discussing advantages of early publication
system while undermining current practices that affect no pre-patent protections).
65 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1988).
66 See H.R. 1733, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
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Another provision of H.R. 1733 amends Title 35 to provide a
prior art effect for published applications. To that end, prior art
would include inventions described in an application for patent,
filed in the United States by another and published pursuant to
this law.
H.R. 1733 takes an additional step to protect those who may not
want their application published. It proposes to amend Title 35 to
enable an independent inventor to defer publication until three
months after an initial patentability determination by the PTO.68
To be eligible for this provision, an inventor must certify that he
or she has not also filed the application in a foreign country
(where it will inevitably be published within eighteen months).
Situations are extremely rare where an independent inventor who
is actively seeking an early PTO action will not obtain one before
three months prior to the eighteenth month of pendency of his/her
application. 69 This provision, however, ensures that such an ac-
tion will be received by qualified independent inventors in a
timely manner. In this way, the independent inventor is given
ample opportunity to withdraw his application and to pursue the
trade secret route when patentability is unlikely.
The other major component of H.R. 1733 is its refinement of the
twenty year term to ensure that virtually every American inven-
tor will gain in patent term under the new system.70 To further
ensure patent protection, it would extend the twenty year term of
a patent for up to ten additional years to compensate for time lost
when an applicant is involved in a proceeding to determine who is
the first to invent, for time lost during a successful appeal of an
examiner's decision, and for time lost due to a secrecy order. 71
Current law allows extensions for only up to five years. 72 In addi-
tion, H.R. 1733 allows up to ten years of recovery for time lost due
to an unusual administrative delay of the PTO, a protection not
67 See id.
68 See id.
69 Id.; see Patent Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 1732 and H.R. 1733, supra note 59 (state-
ment of Bruce A. Lehman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents
and Trademarks) (qualifying rare circumstance to be one where independent inventor has
not received some indication from PTO on his/her application prior to 18 months).
70 See H.R. 1733, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
71 Id.
72 35 U.S.C. § 120 (1988).
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afforded under current law.73 This protection will further ensure
that the applicant will not suffer any loss of term.
IV. UNIVERSAL SUPPORT FOR GATT CHANGES PROPOSED IN
H.R. 1733
As stated earlier, the twenty year term implemented in the
GATT TRIPS Agreement and the eighteen month publication pro-
vision in H.R. 1733 have long had the support of United States
Presidents, Commissioners of Patents and Trademarks, and the
private sector.7 4 A tiny but vocal minority in the patent commu-
nity has suggested that the twenty year term was somehow hid-
den or slipped into the GATT implementing legislation. Nothing
could be further from the truth.75
In 1986, the United States successfully urged GATT members to
include intellectual property protection provisions in the Uruguay
Round negotiations.76 By 1991, the GATT members had reached
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights or TRIPS.77 Among the provisions of this initial agreement
was a proposal to adopt a twenty year term. Thus, the twenty
year term has been a constant since the negotiations began more
than nine years ago.
The twenty year term provisions in the TRIPS Agreement were
also widely available to the members of Congress and the public.
The July 1993 GAO Report referenced earlier noted that the cur-
rent GATT/TRIPS accord required the United States to change its
patent laws and procedures to grant patent protection for twenty
years from the filing date.78 It was also clear from speeches made
by members of Congress to the House of Representatives that it
73 See id.
74 See Sabatelli & Rasser, supra note 4, at 34-38 (discussing need for patent harmoniza-
tion and United States government recognition thereof); see also Hanns Ullrich, TRIPS:
Adequate Protection, Inadequate Trade, Adequate Competition Policy, 4 PAC. Rim L. &
POL'Y J. 153, 178 (1995) (noting call for legislation by U.S. authorities and describing effect
of TRIPS as harmonizing international intellectual property law). See generally Kate H.
Murashige, Harmonization of Patent Laws, 16 Hous. J. INT'L L. 591,597-11 (1994) (arguing
for international harmonization of patent laws).
75 See Sorell et al., supra note 49, at 95 (finding that 20 year patent term provision had
been pending in Congress for eight years without passing).
76 Comparative Patent Experiences, supra note 21.
77 See id. at 70.
78 See id.
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was widely known well in advance that a twenty year term was to
be implemented.79
Finally, on August 12, 1994, more than three and a half months
before the House voted on GATT, the Senate and House held a
public Joint Hearing on the TRIPS Agreement. Several witnesses
testified both for and against the twenty year term, including Mr.
Bruce Lehman, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Com-
missioner of the Patents and Trademarks; Representative Dana
Rohrabacher; Mr. Gerald Mossinghoff, President of the Pharma-
ceutical Research and Manufacturers of America and former Com-
missioner of Patents and Trademarks; Mr. Kenneth F. Addison,
Jr., on behalf of the United Inventors Association of the United
States of America; and Mr. Robert E. Muir, on behalf of the Na-
tional Association of Manufacturers.80
After reviewing this testimony as well as the substance of eight
years of TRIPS negotiations, the Members of Congress voted over-
whelmingly to approve it. The GATT implementing legislation
passed in the Senate by more than a three-quarters majority and
in the House by nearly a two-thirds majority.8 1
Both the twenty year term and the eighteen month publication
provision have the strong support of the current and previous
presidential administrations and Commissioners of Patents and
Trademarks. Five of the past six living Commissioners of Patents
and Trademarks jointly issued a letter to the President, the Sen-
ate, and the House of Representatives urging the United States to
adopt the twenty year term as drafted in the GATT implementing
legislation. 2
Support from previous administrations for these provisions
dates back to 1966, during the Johnson Administration. In a re-
79 See, e.g., 140 CONG. REc. E1,526 (July 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Dana Rohra-
bacher). In that address, Rep. Rohrabacher noted: "The GA7T proposal is to make this
[patent protection] 20 years from the time of filing." Id.
80 GATT and Intellectual Property: Joint Hearings Before The Subcomm. on Intellectual
Property and Judicial Administration of the House Comm. on the Judiciary and the Sub-
comm. on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
81 See supra note 3, and accompanying text.
82 Members of the United States Senate and Members of the United States House of
Representatives include: William E. Shuyler, Jr., Commissioner of Patents and Trade-
marks from 1969-1971; C. Marshall Dann, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks from
1974-1977; Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks from 1981-
1985; Donald J. Quigg, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks from 1985-1989; Harry
F. Manbeck, Jr., Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks from 1990-1992 to the Honora-
ble William J. Clinton.
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port titled "To Promote The Progress of . .Useful Arts" In An Age of
Exploding Technology, the President's Commission on the Patent
System advocated both early publication and a twenty year
term.
8 3
In 1992, the Bush Administration released a comprehensive
study of the United States patent system, also recommending
early publication and a twenty year term.84 Following the recom-
mendations of the Bush Administration studies, the Clinton Ad-
ministration also strongly endorsed these changes.8 5
The twenty year term in GATT and the 18-month publication
provision in H.R. 1733 also has the backing of United States in-
dustry and of every major patent, copyright, and bar association
that has expressed an opinion on these topics. The American In-
tellectual Property Law Association and the Intellectual Property
Owners Association, two of the largest and most respected intel-
lectual property organizations, both embraced these concepts long
before the TRIPS Agreement was adopted and H.R. 1733 was
drafted. 6 The American Bar Association is also a supporter of
these provisions.8 7
83 See Report of the President's Commission on the Patent System, "To Promote The
Progress of... Useful Arts"In An Age of Exploding Technology 2 (1966). Recommendation
VII states, "Publication of a pending application shall occur eighteen to twenty-four months
after its earliest effective filing date, or promptly after allowance or appeal, whichever
comes first. An applicant, for any reason, may request earlier publication of his pending
complete application." Id. Recommendation XVIII states, "The term of a patent shall expire
twenty years after its earliest effective U.S. filing date." Id. at 16-17, 33-34.
84 See Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform, A Report to the Secretary of Com-
merce 3 (1992) (recommending changes in United States patent law to effectuate greater
worldwide harmonization in patent laws); see also Patent Harmonization Act: Joint Hear-
ingmarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property
and Judicial Administration of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1992) [hereinafter Patent Harmonization Act: Joint Hearing].
5 See Patent Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 1732 and H.R. 1733, supra note 59 (state-
ment of Bruce A. Lehman, Assistant of Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of Pat-
ents & Trademarks); see also Impact of GATT Patent Accords, supra note 39 (statement of
Bruce A. Lehman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents &
Trademarks). See generally U.S. Patent Term Developments, 7 No. 2 J. PROPRIETARY RTS.
32 (1995).
86 See Patent Term and Publication Reform Act of 1994: Hearings on S. 1854 Before the
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights & Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1994) (testimony of Gary L. Newston, President of the American
Intellectual Property Law Ass'n) (supporting increased harmonization of global patent laws
via congressional action enacting S. 1854); see also Patent Harmonization Act: Joint Hear-
ing, supra note 84 (statement of Robert B. Benson on behalf of American Intellectual Prop-
erty Law Association and position statement by Intellectual Property Owners Association).
87 See, e.g., American Bar Association Section of Intellectual Property Law Resolutions,
letter to former House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt; Patent Legislation: Hearings on
H.R. 1732 and H.R. 1733, supra note 59 (June 8, 1995) (statement of Thomas E. Smith,
Chair, Section of the Intellectual Property Law Section of the American Bar Ass'n).
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Key industry groups affected by changes in patent laws also
support these provisions. The National Association of Manufac-
turers, with over 13,500 members, advocates the changes imple-
mented by GATT and proposed in H.R. 1733.88 While a handful of
biotechnology companies oppose these changes, H.R. 1733 also has
the endorsement of national Biotechnology Industry Organization
("BIO"), by far the largest association in the industry with over
560 members in forty-seven states and twenty countries. In writ-
ten testimony submitted to the House Subcommittee on Courts
and Intellectual Property, BIO expressed that it "will support the
twenty year patent term" and "that there would be no need to set
a minimum 17 year patent term from grant," so long as proper
safeguards are adopted to prevent loss of term for delays beyond
the control of diligent patent applicants.8 9
There is little doubt as to why these changes have nearly uni-
versal support of American industry groups, businesses, and in-
dependent inventors-because together, they solve the disastrous
problem of submarine patenting while granting an increased pat-
ent term to more than eighty-seven percent of all patentees. 90
88 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS, REPORT ON DOMEsTIC INDusTRY RESPONSE
TO KEY HARMONIZATION IssuEs 3, 11 (Apr. 2, 1990); see also National Association of Manu-
facturers Response to Request of the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks for Public
Comments on Subjects Before the Advisory Commission on Patent Law Reform, 19-27
(July 1991); Patent Harmonization Act: Joint Hearing (Apr. 30, 1992) (statement of Robert
A. Armitage, Vice President Corporate Patents & Trademarks, The UPJOHN Company, on
behalf of Natl Ass'n of Mfrs.).
89 See Patent Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 1732 and H.R. 359 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1995) [hereinafter Patent Legislation Hearings on H.R. 1732 & H.R. 359 (statement
of Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO); see also Letter from Carl B. Feldbaum, Pres-
ident & Charles E. Ludlam, Vice President for Government Relations, Biotechnology Indus-
try Organization, to Mickey Kantor, United States Trade Representative (June 27, 1994)
(on file with Harvard University Journal of Law & Technology).
90 See Mark Lemley, An Empirical Study of the Twenty-Year Patent Term, 22 AIPLA
Q.J. 369, 392-93 (1994) (concluding most patentees would benefit from 20 year patent
term); see also Hearings on H.R. 359 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop-
erty of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (testimony of Pro-
fessor Mark A. Lemley) (arguing that 20 year patent term will cause patent owner to gain,
not lose, protection). But see Jane E.R. Potter & Jean B. Fordis, The Impact of GATT and
TRIPS on U.S. Patent Law, 10 ME. B.J. 400, 401 (1995) (stating new law will not eliminate
submarine patents); see also Richard C. Wilder, The Effect of the Uruguay Round Imple-
menting Legislation on United States Patent Law 36 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 33, 49 (1995) (be-
lieving problem of submarine patents will continue even if legislation passes).
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V. THE SUBMARINE PATENT PROBLEM: UNFAIR COST
TO CONSUMERS
The United States Constitution grants Congress the authority
to enact laws "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and Useful
Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
Exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."91
The United States patent system is designed to cause inventors to
disclose inventions and thereby achieve this goal to promote sci-
ence and the useful arts. 2 In return for their disclosure, inventors
are granted a limited monopoly to exploit their inventions.9 3
However, the old seventeen year term actually discouraged the
timely disclosure of new technology and interfered with the patent
system's primary objective of stimulating progress. Because an
inventor is granted exactly seventeen years from the time a patent
is granted, regardless of how long he or she delays, the inventor
has no incentive to expedite the approval process of his or her pat-
ent. Under the old system, patent attorneys routinely extended
deadlines for up to six months to respond to PTO actions.9 4
Even worse, the seventeen year term was exploited and abused
by some inventors, at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars to
industries, and ultimately consumers. This type of practice is
called submarine patenting because the patent surfaces without
warning to the surprise and detriment of entire industries.95
By filing successive continuing applications on the same inven-
tion, the original applications remain secretly submerged in the
PTO year after year. Under the old system, this was a legal
means of intentional delay perpetrated by the inventor. The pat-
ent application was delayed by the applicant until companies grew
91 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.92 See, e.g., Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 255 (1945) (means to
promote Constitution's goal is patent system).
93 See, e.g., Amy E. Carroll, Not Always the Best Medicine: Biotechnology & The Global
Impact of U.S. Patent Law, 44 AM. U. L. Rzv. 2433, 2443 (1995) (explaining limited monop-
oly granted by patent).
94 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 90, at 386 (1994) (explaining that six month delay by
patent attorney was allowed under old law and lead to increased cost to client).
95 See Joint Hearings on GATT TRIPS Implementing Legislation Before the of the Sub-
comm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and
the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property & Judicial Administration of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (statement of Robert E. Muir, General Patent
Counsel, Caterpillar, Inc., on behalf of National Assoc. of Mfrs.) (asserting that 20 year
patent term would halt emergence of submarine patents); Dana Robrabacher & Paul
Crilly, The Case for a Strong Patent System, 8 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 263, 267-69 (1995) (de-
tailing system of submarine patenting).
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around some remotely related technology or until existing compa-
nies began using some distant form of the inventor's original
claim. Once an industry was firmly depended upon the technol-
ogy, the inventor stopped the delays and took the necessary ac-
tions to get the patent granted (sometimes up to 30 or 40 years
after filing). In a form of extortion, the inventor then demanded
excessive licensing fees for continued use of the now patented pro-
cess. This comes as a brutal surprise to companies who manufac-
ture in the United States. Because it affects entire industries, the
cost is ultimately shouldered by the American consumers.
The most extreme and successful abuse of the seventeen year
term involves a fairly well-known United States inventor who
may have helped pay for full page advertisements in leading na-
tional newspapers opposing changes in United States patent law,
particularly the twenty year patent term, in order to try and pre-
serve this abusive practice. 96 In an article published in May 1993,
The American Lawyer explained how this inventor made millions
of dollars by exploiting a submarine patent.97
Submarine patent abusers do not disclose anything nor do they
promote the progress of science and the useful arts. Just the oppo-
site is true. They deliberately keep their "inventions" secret, thus
depriving the public from using them.98 Then, after decades of de-
lay, they cause the patents to issue so that they can collect "royal-
ties" from existing businesses. These submarine patents are used
as strategic weapons against legitimate businesses who have used
related technology to the benefit of their industries and their
consumers.
This abuse of the United States patent system has been around
for a long time. In fact, it was cited as a major problem as long ago
as the 1966 Report of the President's Commission on the Patent
96 See, e.g., Stewart Yerton, The Sky's The Limit, AMRIucAN LAw., May, 1993, at 64 (de-
tailing inventor, Jerome Lemelson's rise to wealth as result of invention of "machine vi-
sion," integral to bar code scanners, etc., and subsequent patent manipulation).
97 See id. at 69 (explaining how Lemelson's attorney approached major corporations, in-
forming them that bar code scanners and other devices used by them infringed upon
Lemelson's patent, resulting in many large settlements, gaining 400 - 450 million for
Lemelson in 1992 alone).
98 See Rohrabacher & Crilly, supra note 95, at 267 (acknowledging allegation delaying
issuance of patent may be inventor's fault); see also James P. Chandler, The Loss of New
Technology to Foreign Competitors: U.S. Companies Must Search for Protective Solutions,
27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 305, 323 (describing problem of submarine patents).
1996]
486 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 11:465
System.99 There is even evidence of submarine patenting as far
back as 1911, when George Selden used such techniques to gain
control of the early automobile industry until Henry Ford success-
fully challenged his control. 100
The problem of extreme delays in the issuance of patents has
also been recognized in the court system, and the courts have held
that the proper solution rests with an action by Congress. 10 1 Ironi-
cally, even the inventor that was the subject of the American Law-
yer article argued to a court that only Congress could solve the
problem of submarine patents. 10 2 As you might expect, he vehe-
mently opposes H.R. 1733, Congress' proposed solution.
Even a single submarine patent can wreak havoc on an industry
as large as automobile manufacturers. This destructive practice
also led to an unsuccessful challenge of every computer being pro-
duced by the popular computer manufacturer, Apple Computer,
Inc. The patent in question had been filed in 1955 and issued in
1993.103 While not all examples of submarine patenting are this
99 Report of the President's Commission on the Patent System, 'To Promote The Pro-
gress of... Useful Arts" In An Age of Exploding Technology, 33-34 (1966). The term of a
United States patent now extends for a period of 17 years from the date of issuance. Id.
Measuring the patent term from this point encourages deliberate delays in the prosecution
of applications, particularly those filed primarily for speculative reasons and those having
little immediate value. Another effect can be the filing of continued applications solely to
delay the start of a patent term. Id.
The proposed change [to a 20 year from filing system] would induce the applicant
promptly to present claims that he believes patentable and to avoid delaying the prosecu-
tion of the application. Id. Since the term of a patent stemming from a continuing applica-
tion would expire on the same day as one issued on its parent application, there would be
less incentive to use a continuing application for the purpose of delay. Id.
100 See Lemley, supra note 90, at 378 (noting historical example of submarine patenting
by George Selden, patent attorney and inventor, who obtained patent on prototype automo-
bile in 1895).
101 Application of Hilmer, 424 F.2d 1108, 1113-14 n.6 (C.C.P.A. 1970). "If the law as it
has been written by Congress creates anomalous situations, then it is for Congress to de-
cide whether to change the law." Id.; Application of Henriksen, 399 F.2d 253, 262 (C.C.P.A.
1968). It is "unfortunate that a patent should be granted on an application.., filed over 20
years ago ... [i]t is our view, as the judiciary, that it is for the Congress to decide, with the
usual opportunity for public hearing and debate, whether such a restriction as sought by
the board is to be imposed." Id.
102 Ford Motor Co. v. Lemelson, Nos. CV-N-92-613-LDG(PHA), CV-N-92-545-
LDG(PHA), 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12015, at *11 (D. Nev. June 16, 1995) (stating Jerome
Lemelson's position that "courts are without any power to limit continuing application
practice, and that any limitations must be imposed by Congress").
103 See Patent Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 1732 and H.R. 359, supra note 89 (testi-
mony of Edward Stead, Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary, Apple Computer,
Inc. on behalf of Information Technology Industry Council) (illuminating circumstances
surrounding patent infringement case brought against Apple Computer, Inc. wherein pat-
ent was issued in 1955 and not issued until 1993, 35 years later).
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egregious, in each case the practice inhibits the goal of the United
States patent system at the expense of the consuming public.
More examples of submarine patenting can be cited. The above
illustrations, however, indicate that the significance of these sub-
marine patents lies not in the number of such cases but in the
destructive effects caused by them. The exact number of inten-
tional submarine patent instances cannot be estimated to a degree
of certainty-"intentions" are too subjective to determine and
quantify. However, one study attempted to measure a proxy for
submarine patents and estimated that between 1.6% to 20% of the
patents in a particular industry could be submarine patents.1 0 4
Furthermore, of the few patents that would lose four or more
years under the present system, between 25-67% could be classi-
fied as submarine patents. 105
In addition, the testimony of one independent inventor, at a
hearing before the House Subcommittee on Courts and Intellec-
tual Property, reveals that submarine patenting may be a fairly
common practice-at least on a small scale. Mr. Bill Budinger
made two important points at that hearing. First, Mr. Budinger
stated that he knew of approximately three hundred important
patents issued by the United States PTO to foreign companies in
the two years prior to the change that he believed were deliber-
ately delayed. All of these patents will expire in the United States
five to twenty-five years after they expire in their home countries.
Thus, technology in these areas will be frozen in this country for
five to twenty-five years while it advances in the foreign coun-
tries.1 0 6 Secondly, Mr. Budinger relayed how he employed subma-
rine patent techniques to elongate the patent term on his first in-
vention and why it is an option that some inventors would like to
keep open. 10 7
As long as there is a filing system based upon time of issuance,
this abuse remains a possibility. Only Congress can solve the
104 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 90, at 414-15 (setting forth statistics illustrating
number of submarine patents by industry).
105 Id. at 393.
106 See Patent Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 1732 and H.R. 359, supra note 89 (testi-
mony of William D. Budinger, Chairman and CEO, Rodel, Inc.) (stating that 17 year patent
term suggested by H.R. 359 would make American companies vulnerable to foreign
competition).
107 See id. (stating that record confirms what Budinger knew from experience-that ap-
plicants will not pursue issuance of patents because protection starts at time of filing).
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problem of submarine patenting.10 8 Congress began that solution
by implementing the twenty year term in the GATT implementing
legislation. Congress can continue to solve this problem by re-
jecting H.R. 359 and passing H.R. 1733.
VI. VIRTUALLY ALL PATENTEES GAIN PATENT TERM UNDER THE
PRESENT SYSTEM AND H.R. 1733
Aside from the obvious goal to preserve the opportunity to en-
gage in submarine patenting, there is no justification for rolling
back the gains and reverting back to the old system. Claims have
been made that the old system better preserves patent term.10 9
However, a twenty year term will result in an increase in patent
protection for the vast majority of patent applicants.
Clearly, any patent that is granted in less than three years will
result in an increase under the present system compared to the
old system. Although the figures for fiscal year 1995 are not yet
available, the PTO reported that the average time period for over-
all pendency (from filing to issuance or abandonment) for patent
applications decreased from nineteen and a half months in fiscal
year 1993 to nineteen months in fiscal year 1994.110 For com-
puters, pendency was reduced from twenty-eight and a half
months to twenty-six and a half months in 1994. Finally, biotech-
nology patent pendency was reduced from twenty-two and a fifth
months to twenty and four-fifths months. It is clear from these
figures that the average patent holder will gain patent protection
under the present system, even in industries where patents tradi-
tionally take longer to issue.
Mark Lemley, an Associate Professor at the University of Texas
School of Law recently conducted a comprehensive independent
study comparing these alternatives. This is the only properly con-
108 See supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing benefits to Japanese patent
publication system).
109 See Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 874 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) (stating it's not "in any manner improper to amend or insert claims intended to
cover a competitor's product the applicant's attorney has learned about during the prosecu-
tion of a patent application"), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1067 (1989); see also State Industries,
Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985). "One of the benefits of a
patent system is its so-called 'negative incentive' to 'design around' a competitor's products,
even when they are patented, thus bringing a steady flow of innovations to the market-
place." Id.
110 Working for Our Customers, A Patent and Trademark Office Review (Fiscal Year
1994), U.S. Dep't of Commerce, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, at 9 (1994).
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trolled and credible study available which compares the two sys-
tems.'11 Professor Lemley studied 2,081 recently issued and ran-
domly selected patents. His testimony before the Subcommittee
revealed five situations. First, under the most realistic set of as-
sumptions, the average patent owner gains an average of 426 days
or fourteen months of protection over the seventeen year term.
Even under the most pessimistic assumptions, he or she gains 253
days or eight and a half months. Second, under the most realistic
set of assumptions 87.1% of patent owners in the United States
gain term under the twenty year term. Even under the most pes-
simistic assumptions, 76.8%, over three-quarters, gain term.
Third, under the realistic assumptions, only 2.2% of patent own-
ers would lose significant term (i.e. two or more years of protec-
tion). Under the most pessimistic assumptions, only 5.3% of all
American patent owners would lose two or more years. These
numbers do not even take into account the various term extension
provisions that have been enacted into the new law to protect
against delay due to interference, and delay due to appeal. They
also do not take into account proposed additional provisional pro-
tection in H.R. 1733. Fourth, for 48% of the patents that would
lose significant term, the cause for the delay was the applicant
himself or herself abandoning and refiling the application in the
PTO three or more times during the course of prosecution. These
delays are the result of the patent owner or applicant's inability to
shorten or reduce the delay, not the result of inherent delays in
the patent process, and not the result of the fault of the PTO.
Fifth, there is no evidence that the most important patents are the
ones that take longer in the PTO. While it is impossible to iden-
tify the "most important" patents, litigated patents-the patents
that applicants care enough about actually to take to court to en-
force-can be identified. There is no difference between the liti-
gated patents that are actually enforced as a result of being held
valid by the courts and those that are found to be invalid. They
take on average almost exactly the same amount of time. Indeed,
some validly litigated patents, patents that were of sufficient im-
111 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 90, at 393 (asserting that New York study claiming
average pendency is close to seven years is incorrect).
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portance to invest the money in enforcing them against infringers,
issued in the Patent Office in as little as eight months. 112
Professor Lemley also found that the benefits of the twenty year
term were consistent across industry lines. He classified each pat-
ent in his study as a general, electrical, chemical, software, or bio-
technology patent. In every industry where conclusions could be
drawn, a large majority of patentees would gain protection under
the twenty year term. The data for the biotechnology industry
was indeterminate to draw a conclusion as to whether term was
gained under the most realistic set of assumptions."13
Professor Lemley's conclusions prove that nearly all patent
holders will gain term under the current twenty year term. The
benefits to the American consumers and to American businesses
from eliminating the submarine patent problem simply outweigh
the loss of term to a fraction of patentees. With the incentive for
submarine patents removed, even this small fraction is likely to
disappear.
CONCLUSION
Some changes in our patent system are necessary to meet the
challenges of the 1990s and the next century-challenges both in
the global marketplace and at home. The changes proposed in
H.R. 1733 reflect a well-reasoned and informed approach to mod-
ernizing United States patent law. Together with the recent im-
provements implemented by GATT, H.R. 1733 will compel foreign
countries to better accommodate American inventors, end the con-
stant threat of submarine patenting, and increase patent term for
most every successful patent applicant. The provisions of H.R.
359 would require the United States to violate international
agreements, weaken the United States' position in future intellec-
tual property negotiations, and encourage submarine patenting at
a cost of potentially billions of dollars to consumers. For the
United States to continue to move forward, the choice is clear.
112 See Patent Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 1732 and H.R. 359, supra note 89 (state-
ment of Professor Mark Lemley, Assistant Professor, University of Texas School of Law)
(discussing his position that returning to 17 year patent term would be detrimental).
113 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 90, at 415-16 (defining indeterminate as "not possible to
predict with reasonable confidence that patentees will be either better or worse off under
new law").
